The 19th Export Control Day, hosted by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) and the Centre for Foreign Trade Law (ZAR), took place in Berlin on 22 and 23 May 2025. This year’s event was held under the heading “Emerging Export Control.” The first day was shaped more by political topics, while the second day focused on export control and academia, compliance and due diligence obligations, as well as current developments from BAFA.
As in the previous year, there was talk of the international order moving towards a multipolar arrangement, one that jeopardises the WTO and, ultimately, the multilateral economic order. At present, it was said, power frequently trumps law, and politics is no longer based on diplomacy but exclusively on economic interests. It was also noted that pressure from the United States on the EU to align its export control regime with that of the United States is set to increase.
Against this backdrop, it was particularly interesting that a representative of the U.S. Department of Commerce (BIS) and a lawyer from Shanghai both contributed, speaking on developments in U.S. export control and in Chinese export control law respectively.
The United States is set to tighten controls in particular in the areas of semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum technology. It was announced that export controls would become “simpler, stricter and more effective” than under the Biden administration, with “aggressive enforcement in case of violations” to be expected. It is the President’s declared aim to put a stop to circumvention of semiconductor export controls. It is also part of the President’s “America First” policy to align the interests and controls of U.S. allies in the field of sensitive technologies, in order to achieve a “level playing field.”
China, meanwhile, is continuously developing its export control regime, using export controls as a tool to protect national security. A new dual-use regulation has been in force there since 1 December 2024, which also restricts the export of goods not explicitly listed on the Export Control List (ECL), but whose control is nonetheless in the national security interest of the People’s Republic of China. This applies, in particular, with regard to the United States. In addition, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) publishes various export control lists, consolidated in an export control catalogue. Temporary export controls are also introduced by MOFCOM for certain goods, for example on 4 February 2025 for tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium, meaning MOFCOM’s website should be checked regularly to stay up to date. In addition, there are so-called “black lists” of countries that may not receive dual-use goods from China. China also has an Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL), under which natural or legal persons participating in sanctions directed against China must expect countermeasures. Such persons can, for example, be added to the “Unreliable Entity List” (UEL), which functions similarly to the United States’ Entity List. There are also blocking rules that prohibit compliance with, and the extraterritorial application of, certain foreign sanctions.
Finally, there was a report straight from BAFA’s own “engine room.” As usual, proposals are being developed for amending Annex I of the dual-use list, which will be amended accordingly in the third quarter of the year. Listing proposals that do not make it into Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation are instead added to Part I B of the national export list. The 18th sanctions package against Russia is already in preparation and is expected to be, once again, more extensive than the 17th package. The new sanctions package will then, once again, be the subject of BAFA publications. In addition, BAFA has either substantially revised or newly published a number of guidance notes:
- BAFA guidance note on general authorisations and the related registration and reporting procedure (05/2025)
- BAFA guidance note on foreign trade with the Russian Federation (09/05/2025)
- BAFA guidance note on preventing sanctions circumvention (21/05/2025)
Businesses are expected to carry out responsible due diligence, though what constitutes an “appropriate” level of diligence is highly individual, varying from company to company depending on the industry sector and customer base. Implementing black or grey lists is only feasible to a limited extent, since attempts to circumvent controls and procure goods from Russia are extremely dynamic, meaning any such list would already be outdated by the time it was updated. Companies within the EU are, and should remain, best placed to identify suspicious orders and assess the risk of sanctions circumvention themselves. Where suspicious transactions arise, extensive use should be made of the reporting mechanism under Article 6b of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Every report is helpful, even where there is sometimes no direct response from BAFA.
It was noted that the obligation to agree the so-called no-Russia clause, in particular, poses challenges for companies and is perceived by some as an example of over-regulation. Nevertheless, according to BAFA, given the high volume of deliveries of critical goods to Russia, it is possible that such blanket rules will be extended in the future. The planned reform of the AWG, which was actually supposed to have been adopted during the last legislative term but did not make it through the Bundestag in time, is now to be introduced into the new Bundestag in the near future. Since the Federal Republic of Germany has, since 20 May 2025, been in breach of its treaty obligations owing to its failure to transpose Directive (EU) 2024/1226, prompt adoption of the new AWG is to be expected.
Beyond the formal sessions, there were numerous opportunities to continue the discussions in the conference hotel or at the evening reception at the Lindenbräu, and to exchange views on the topics covered.
We would like to thank everyone at BAFA and ZAR involved in organising a successful Export Control Day 2025.
