On 21 May 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-483/23 “T-Trust”, ruled on a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the scope of the freezing of funds under Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 in the case of a settlor of a trust who is listed in Annex I to that Regulation.
The question to be decided was to what extent assets must be economically attributed to a sanctioned person, such that they cannot be shielded from the reach of EU sanctions merely by being transferred to a trust. What matters instead is whether the person concerned continues to exercise, or is able to exercise, relevant control or powers of disposal over the assets. The CJEU held that the freezing of assets held by a trust is, in principle, compatible with EU law.
The ruling was based on the following facts: four Italian companies and a Swiss trust company, T, on one side, and the Italian supervisory authorities on the other, were in dispute over the freezing of funds of the Italian companies, which are wholly controlled by a parent company that was settled into a trust in 2007, of which T is the current trustee. On 16 March 2022, the funds of the four Italian companies were frozen by the Italian Financial Security Committee (Comitato di Sicurezza Finanziaria). It took the view that these funds were indirectly attributable to the settlor of the trust, who was subject to restrictive measures — namely, listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — and was regarded as the beneficial owner of these companies.
The CJEU clarified that Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 covers a wide range of situations, ranging from ownership of funds and resources to situations in which actual power over the funds and resources can be exercised, whether directly or indirectly. This provision is thus applicable to many legal and factual situations in which a person has a power enabling them to use the funds and resources, derive a benefit from them, dispose of them, or exert influence over them. In order to ensure the practical effectiveness of this provision, the terms “ownership” and “control” cover factual situations in which such a power exists even where it is formally held by another person or entity, or where a power of influence exists in the absence of any legal relationship.
Where the rights relating to those funds and resources are held in the name of the trustee, those funds and resources may therefore be regarded as owned, or controlled, by the settlor of the trust if that settlor has a power enabling them to use the funds and resources, derive a benefit from them, dispose of them, or exert influence over them or over the trustee’s decisions relating to the funds and economic resources contributed to that trust by that settlor. This concerns not merely the formal possibility as confirmed in legal instruments, but also actual influence in practice. The judgment cites numerous examples of what constitutes such influence.
Significance for businesses and advisers: The decision underscores that sanctions screening must not rely solely on the formal ownership structure. Companies, banks, and other obliged entities must, in particular in the case of complex shareholding and asset structures, examine who actually has the ability to exert influence over assets. Trusts, fiduciary arrangements, or comparable structures therefore offer no automatic protection against the freezing of assets.
For compliance and legal departments, this means that the examination of beneficial ownership and actual control possibilities is becoming increasingly important — particularly in business relationships involving complex international holding, trust, and fiduciary structures.
Even where a sanctioned person — as in the case at hand — was excluded as a beneficiary of a trust prior to their listing, a freezing measure may still be warranted. What is decisive is whether the person continues, as a matter of fact, to be able to exert influence over the assets or over the trustee’s decisions, to use the assets, or to derive an economic benefit from them. Businesses should therefore, in their sanctions screening, analyze not only formal ownership relationships but, in particular, actual structures of influence and control.
